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CONTRACT TO DEVISE OR BEQUEATH AS AN
ESTATE PLANNING DEVICE*
BERTEL M. SPAP S**

Contracts to make wills are frequently included in arrangements
for the devolution of an individual's assets. Almost as frequently these
contracts are created by laymen and brought into being without the
advice of counsel. A reading of most of the cases dealing with this estate
planning tool leaves the impression that even where legal advice has
been sought counsel have done little more than give a reluctant acquiescence to a plan engineered by the client. In spite of this reluctance
on the part of the legal profession contracts to make wills are still being
used in large quantities. This creates a situation calling for an inquiry
into the social interests served by such contracts and an evaluation of
the professional responsibility toward them.
Among aged men and women of modest means, and the vast majority of the aged are of modest means, there is a strong desire to retain
ownership of what property they possess until death. There is also the
desire, and it might be said the necessity, to provide care, support, and
maintenance, and in many instances companionship and society, for
themselves. A contract to make a will is the only legal device through
which this purpose can be achieved. A trust, even if it could be assumed
that the person in need of such care did not object to transferring title to
a trustee, would usually not yield a sufficient income to achieve the
desired purpose. If a life estate with power to consume is attempted the
estate is likely to be entirely consumed before the time arrives when it

*This article is based upon a section of a thesis written in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the S.JD. degree at the University of Michigan Law School.
**Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
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is most critically needed. The property involved often consists of real
estate being used as a home. The only means of obtaining the necessary
support and maintenance directly is by converting the property into
money, thereby destroying the very thing that is sought to be preserved.
By means of a contract to make a will such a property owner may obtain
the care or nursing needed and also such intangibles as society and companionship.1 An agreement whereby some friend or relative moves into
the old person's home and provides board, lodging, or such other services
as might be agreed upon in return for a promise by the elderly person
to leave the property to the friend or relative concerned can well prove
a genuine economic advantage to both parties to the transaction.
A contract to make a will is often the most convenient device for
providing for the care of an infant child. The child may be surrendered
to the promisor to be brought up as the promisor's child under an agreement by the promisor to provide for the child by will. Such contracts
may or may not include agreements for adoption of the child and may
be made with the child's parent, 2 with a social agency having respon4
sibility for the child, 3 or, under some circumstances, with the child.
In return for the filial devotion which the child is called upon to render
it is given a home and the prospect of an inheritance.

1. Undoubtedly more contracts to make wills are entered into for this than
for any other purpose. Illustrative of the cases involving arrangements of this type
the following may be mentioned: Bolander v. Godsil, 116 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1940);
Stone v. Burgeson, 215 Ala. 23, 109 So. 155 (1926); Scham v. Besse, 397 I1. 309, 74
N.E.2d 517 (1947); White v. Massee, 202 Iowa 1304, 211 N.W. 839 (1927); Bless v.
Blizzard, 86 Kan. 230, 120 Pac. 351 (1912); Brickley v. Leonard, 129 Me. 94, 149
Ati. 833 (1930); Nichols v. Reed, 186 Md. 317, 46 A.2d 695 (1946); Bird v. Pope,
73 Mich. 483, 41 N.W. 514 (1889); Simonson v. Moseley, 183 Minn. 525, 237 N.W. 413
(1931); Sutton v. Hayden, 62 Mo. 101 (1876); Carter v. Witherspoon, 156 Miss. 597,
126 So. 388 (1930); Robinette v. Olsen, 114 Neb. 728, 209 N.W. 614 (1926); Southern
v. Kittredge, 85 N.H. 307, 158 Ati. 132 (1932); Davison v. Davison, 13 N.J.Eq. (2
Beasley) 246 (1861); Parsell v. Stryker, 41 N.Y. 480 (1869); Brock v. Noecker, 66
N.D. 567, 267 N.W. 656 (1936); Stichler Estate, 359 Pa. 262, 59 A.2d 51 (1948); Bruce

v. Moon, 57 S.C. 60, 35 SM. 415 (1900); Estate of Soles, 215 Wis. 129, 253 N.W. 801
(1934); Loffus v. Maw, 3 Giff. 592, 66 Eng. Rep. 544 (1862).

2. Rogers v. Schlotterback, 167 Calif. 35, 138 Pac. 728 (1914); Furman v.
Craine, 18 Calif. App. 41, 121 Pac. 1007 (1912); Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolff,
191 Ga. 111, 11 SX.2d 766 (1940); Chehak v. Battles, 133 Iowa 107, 110 N.W. 330 (1907);
Anderson v. Anderson, 75 Kan. 117, 88 Pac. 743 (1907); Skinner v. Rasche, 165 Ky.
108, 176 S.W. 942 (1915); Van Tine v. Van Tine, 15 AtI. 249 (N.J.Eq. 1888).
There is authority that the surrender of a child by a parent in consideration of
a promise to make a will in favor of the child is in effect treating the child as
property and is disruptive of the family relationship and therefore against public
policy. Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122, 131-132, 229 S.W. 1114, 1118-1119, 15
A.L.R. 216, 222-223 (1921). See Note 15 A.L.R. 223 (1921).
3. Matter of Stevens, 192 Misc. Rep. 179, 78 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
4. Purviance v. Shultz, 16 Ind. App. 94, 44 N.E. 766 (1896).
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Antenuptial agreements often include property settlements which
necessitate wills by one or both the parties.5 This is especially true where
the parties to the marriage are older and one or both of them have
extensive prior moral obligations concerning the disposition of their
property. Contracts of this type have been recognized and enforced
from a very early date.
A contract to devise or bequeath is often found to be a vital part
of property settlement agreements upon divorce or separation of the
spouses.6 It can also be a subject for a contract between an unwed
7
mother and a putative father for the care of their illegitimate child.
In each of these instances it is used because it is the most convenient
tool available and because it more nearly approaches the desires of all
parties concerned than would any present transfer of property.
Although contracts for the making of wills are most frequently
involved in various forms of family arrangements this is by no means
their sole area of usefulness. If clearly understood and wisely employed
a contract to make a will is especially adaptable to some types of commercial or business needs. They have been used as devices for maintaining control of a corporation, 8 as a means for planning the disposition
of partnership assets,9 and as a method by which an employer is sometimes enabled to retain an especially valuable employee.' 0
Closely related to the problem of contracts to make wills is the

5. DeJong v. Huyser, 233 Iowa 1315, 11 N.W.2d 566 (1943); Busque v. Marcou,
147 Me. 289, 86 A.2d 873 (1952) (unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds);

Eaton v. Eaton, 233 Mass. 351, 124 N.E. 37 (1919); Dickinson v. Seaman, 193 N.Y.
18, 85 N.E. 818 (1908); Phalen v. U.S. Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 178, 78 N.E. 943 (1906);

Talley v. Harris, 199 Okia. 47, 182 P.2d 765 (1947); Synge v. Synge (1894) 1 Q.B. 466.
6. Barr v. Ferris, 41 Calif. App. 2d 527, 107 P.2d 269 (1940); Wides v. Wides'
Ex'r, 299 Ky. 103, 184 S.W.2d 579 (1944); Getchell v. Tinker, 291 Mich. 267, 289

N.W. 156 (1939); In re Hoyt's Estate, 174 Misc. Rep. 512, 21 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Surr. Ct.
1940); In re Tanenbaum's Estate, 258 App. Div. 285, 16 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1939), motion
for leave to appeal denied, 258 App. Div. 1054, 17 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1940), motion for
leave to appeal denied, 282 N.Y. 810, 25 N.E.2d 881 (1940).
7. Sybilla v. Connally, 66 Ga. App. 678, 18 S.E.2d 783 (1942); Hehr's Adm'r v.
Hehr, 288 Ky. 580, 157 S.W.2d 111 (1941); Moore's Adm'r v. Wagers' Adm'r, 243 Ky.
351, 48 S.W.2d 15 (1932); Lewis v. Creech's Aclm'r, 162 Ky. 763, 173 S.W. 133 (1915).
8. Legro v. Kelley, 311 Mass. 674, 42 N.E.2d 836 (1942).

9. Here as elsewhere the contract is for the transfer of property interests at
death. Whether or not there is express provision for the execution of a will is not
the material factor. Hale v. Wilmarth, 274 Mass. 186, 174 N.E. 232 (1931); Murphy
v. Murphy, 217 Mass. 233, 104 N.E. 466 (1914).
10. Morrison v. Land, 169 Calif. 580, 147 Pac. 259 (1915); Settlemires v. Corum,
304 Ky. 105, 200 S.W.2d 105 (1947).
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problem of joint and mutual wills. 1 Such wills might or might not be
the result of a contract. Circumstances leading to the making of joint
and mutual wills, as well as the circumstances leading to the various
types of contracts to make wills, are situations that can easily arise even
where no contract exists. There is nothing unusual about a husband
and wife executing wills in similar form and with reciprocal provisions
without ever having contracted to do so. Likewise a son, nephew, or
other relative might exert his principal energies toward the care and
maintenance of an elderly couple for no reason other than his love and
respect for them. On the other hand he might contract to render such
care and maintenance in consideration of a promise by the person receiving the services to make a will in his favor. These factors have led
to peculiarly conflicting policy considerations in many instances. Sometimes there is displayed a tendency to find a contract upon very shallow
evidence. 1 2 But there has also developed the rather general rule that
evidence of a contract to make a will must be clear and convincing.'8
It is this latter rule that must be kept in mind when there is an occasion
to advise clients contemplating entering into contracts of this type.
The Statute of Frauds requires that in certain instances contracts
to make wills must be in writing. 14 Some states require by statute that

11. By the term "joint will" it is meant the wills of two or more persons expressed on one piece of paper and executed as the will of each of them. Mutual
wills are the wills of two or more persons executed as separate documents but are
in such form that when they are considered together they show on their face, by
their reciprocal provisions or otherwise, that they were intended as part of one
integrated scheme or plan. See generally Eagleton, Joint and Mutual Wills: Mutual
Promises to Devise as a Means of ConveVancing, 15 CoRN. L. Q. 358 (1930); Partridge,
The Revocability of Mutual or Reciprocal Willis, 77 U. or PA. L. REV. 357 (1929).
12. E.g. Trindle v. Zimmerman, 115 Colo. 323, 172 P.2d 676 (1946). See also
Chambers v. Porter, 183 N.W. 431, 434 (Iowa 1921) (suggesting that the mere presence of reciprocal provisions is sufficient to prove the contractual relationship).
13. Moumal v. Walsh, 9 Alaska 656, 662 (1940) ("clear, satisfactory and convincing"); Crowell v. Parks, 209 Ark. 803, 804-805, 193 S.W.2d 483, 484 (1946) (declaring that the evidence must be substantially beyond reasonable doubt); Rolls v.
Allen, 204 Calif. 604, 608, 269 Pac. 450, 452 (1928) ("most indisputable"); Matthews
v. Blanos, 201 Ga. 549, 563, 40 S.E.2d 715, 726 (1946) (apparently taking the extreme
position that the contract must be proved beyond reasonable doubt); Klussman v.
Wessling, 238 Ill. 568, 572, 87 N.E. 544, 546 (1909) ("dearest and most convincing");
Soho v. Wimbrough, 145 Md. 498, 510, 125 Ati. 767, 771 (1924) ("definite and certain,
strong and convincing"); In re Estate of LeBorius, 224 Minn. 203, 214, 28 N.W.2d
157, 163 (1947) ("clear, positive, and convincing"); Cox v. Williamson, 124 Mont.
512, 525, 227 P.2d 614, 621 (1951) ("clear, cogent, and convincing"); McGregor v.
McGregor, 25 Wash. 2d 511, 513, 171 P.2d 694, 695 (1946) (evidence required to be
beyond all legitimate controversy); CoLo. STAT. ANNx. c. 176, §70 (1) (Supp. 1953).
14. A contract to devise real estate is within the Statute of Frauds provision
requiring that contracts to convey be in writing. Miller v. Carr, 137 Fla. 114, 188
So. 103 (1939); Rudd v. Planters Bank & Trust Co., 283 Ky. 351, 141 S.W.2d 299
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all such contracts be in writing. 15 When it is remembered that in most
instances by the time action is brought to enforce a contract to make a

will the promisor is dead and the promisee is faced with the restrictions
imposed by the various "dead man statutes" as well as the requirement
that the contract be proved by clear and convincing evidence, the importance of always putting the contract into writing becomes apparent.
Joint and mutual wills are such uncertain quantities that they should
never be executed without a full and complete declaration on their face
as to whether they are or are not executed pursuant to contract. 16 This
suggestion is especially applicable to joint wills, devices which should
be discouraged wherever possible since the desired results can be just
as easily obtained and the intention of the parties more clearly expressed
in separate instruments.
Once the contract has been entered into the relationship of the
parties and the nature of the interests created should be analyzed in

(1940); Donovan v. Walsh, 238 Mass. 356, 130 N.E. 841 (1921); Salsbury v. Sackrider,
284 Mich. 493, 280 N.W. 926 (1938). The same is true of a contract to devise or
bequeath an entire estate if the estate includes realty. Cheatham's Ex'r v. Parr,
308 Ky. 175, 214 S.W.2d 91 (1948); Lemire v. Haley, 91 N.H. 357, 19 A.2d 436 (1941);
In re Byrne's Estate, 122 Pa. Super. 413, 186 Atl. 187 (1936); Kessler v. Olen, 228
Wis. 662, 280 N.W. 352, rehearing denied, 228 Wis. 662, 281 N.W. 691 (1938). A contract to bequeath personalty might be within the "sale of goods" provision of the
Statute of Frauds. Wallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522, 5 N.E. 666 (1886); Maloney v.
Maloney, 258 Ky. 567, 80 S.W.2d 611 (1935); Boyle v. Dudley, 87 N.H. 282, 179 Atl.
11 (1935). Contracts to devise or bequeath are sometimes required to be in writing
because they are agreements "made upon consideration of marriage." Austin v.
Kuehn, 21 IM. 113, 71 N.E. 841 (1904); Tellez v. Tellez, 51 N.M. 416, 186 P.2d 390
(1947); Caton v. Caton, 1865, L.R, 1 Ch. 137. But a contract to devise or bequeath
is not required to be in writing as a contract not to be performed within a year since
it is possible that performance might be within that time. Appleby v. Noble, 101
Conn. 54, 124 Atl. 717 (1924); Berger v. Jackson, 156 Fla. 251, 23 So.2d 265 (1945);
Heery v. Reed, 80 Kan. 380, 102 Pac. 846 (1909).
15. CAw. Cirv. CODE § 1624 (1949); ME.REV. STAT. c. 106, § 1 (1944), as amended
by P.L. c. 185 (1947); MAss. ANr. LAWS c. 259, § 5 (1933); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 31;
OHIo REV. CODE Am. § 2107.04 (1954).
16. The following cases involve wills containing statements either accomplishing
this purpose or having some tendency in that direction: Hays v. Jones, 122 Fla. 67,
164 So. 841 (1935) (mere request that the survivor make a particular disposition of
the property not evidence of a contract to that effect); Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538,
191 N.E. 307 (1934) (no clear declaration that a contract was made but alternating
references to the instrument as "this ...will" and "this convenant" held to indicate
a will executed pursuant to contract); Berry v. Berry's Estate, 168 Kan. 253, 212
P.2d 283 (1949) (joint will stating on its face that it was made pursuant to contract);
In re Estate of Pennington, 158 Kan. 495, 148 P.2d 516 (1944) (declaration in one of
two mutual wills that it was made "in consideration" of the other held not to
indicate a contract); McGinn v. Gilroy, 178 Ore. 24, 165 P.2d 73 (1946) (acceptance
of a legacy which the will states is made pursuant to contract estops the legatee from
denying the statement); Hoffert's Estate, 65 Pa. Super. 515 (1917) (statement that
the parties had "agreed" not sufficient to show they had made a contract).
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terms of contract principles. Failure to adhere to this rule and the
attempt in some quarters to treat the transaction as a testamentary, yet
enforceable, arrangement is the source of much of the confusion so prevalent in this area. The contract may concern a specified sum of money,
certain identified property, or, as is more often the case, all or a specified
fractional part of the property owned by the promisor at his death. In
each of these instances the promisor is bound by the terms of the contract
from the moment it is entered into even though he has no obligation to
perform until his death. In the event of a contract to devise specific real
estate he is in a position similar to that of a vendor under a contract to
sell real estate. He is entitled to the use and occupation of the land and
retains legal title to it. However, an inter vivos conveyance to one other
than a bona fide purchaser will not deprive the promisee of his rights
under the contract. 17 Nor is the promisee compelled to wait until the
time for performance to secure protection of his interest. If a conveyance
is made to one who is not a bona fide purchaser, the promisee may
proceed in equity immediately, while the promisor is still living, to have
the transfer set aside18 or to obtain a decree that the grantee holds the
property subject to the contract. 19 If the promisor makes an inter vivos
disposition of specific non-unique personal property which is the subject
of the contract an action for its value may be maintained against his
estate. 20 If the contract is for all or a fractional part of the property
owned by the promisor at death, the promisor is left free to deal with
his property in the way that is customary in the normal conduct of one's
affairs and may dispose of it completely if it becomes necessary to his
own maintenance, support, or reasonable comfort. 21 He is free to make
gifts of the type ordinarily made by one of his station in life, 22 but

17. Stone v. Lacy, 242 Ala. 393, 6 So.2d 481 (1942); Osborn v. Hoyt, 181 Calif.
336, 184 Pac. 854 (1919); Newman v. French, 138 Iowa 482, 116 N.W. 468 (1908);
Kastell v. Hillman, 53 N.J.Eq. 49, 30 Atl. 535 (1894); McCullom v. Mackrell, 13 S.D.
262, 83 N.W. 255 (1900).
18. White v. Massee, 202 Iowa 1304, 211 N.W. 839 (1927); Brackenbury v.
Hodgkin, 116 Me. 399, 102 Atl. 106 (1917); Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 76,
40 N.W. 173 (1888); Pflugar v. Pultz, 43 N.J.Eq. 440, 11 AtI. 123 (1887); Davison v.
Davison, 13 N.J.Eq. (2 Beasley) 246 (1861).
19. Clancy v. Flusky, 187 M11.
605, 58 N.E. 594 (1900) (promisor died during the
pendency of the suit, and the decree rendered merely quieted title in the promisee);
Newman v. French, 138 Iowa 482, 116 N.W. 468 (1908); Hill v. Ribble, 132 N.J.Eq.
486, 28 A.2d 780 (1942); Van Duyne v. Vreeland, 12 N.J.Eq. (1 Beasley), 142 (1858).
20. Ragsdale v. Achuff, 324 Mo. 1159, 27 S.W.2d 6 (1930).
21. See Price v. Aylor, 258 Ky. 1, 4, 79 S.W.2d 350, 351 (1935).

22. Noble v. Metcalf, 157 Ala. 295, 47 So. 1007 (1908); Ohms v. Church of the
Nazarene, 64 Idaho 262, 130 P.2d 679 (1942); National Life Insurance Co. v. Watson,
141 Kan. 903, 44 P.2d 269 (1935); Dickinson v. Seaman, 193 N.Y. 18, 85 N.E. 818 (1908).
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unreasonable gifts tending toward the dissipation of the estate may be
set aside even while he is still alive. 23 In addition to the equitable relief
available to the promisee he may pursue his remedy at law in many
instances prior to the promisor's death. Where the promisor makes a
disposition inconsistent with the contract or where there is an outright
repudiation the promisee may either treat the contract as rescinded and
maintain an action in quantum meruit for the value of the consideration
rendered 24 or he may sue on the contract on the theory of an anticipatory
25
breach.
The important consideration to keep in mind is that whether the

proceeding is at law or in equity the right being enforced is a right
arising out of contract. Neglect of this apparently obvious principle has

led to more confusion in dealing with this type of contract than all other
factors combined. Neither an action for an affirmative injunction to
compel the execution of an appropriate will nor an action to enjoin the

execution of an inconsistent will or to prevent the revocation of a will
already executed should be entertained. 26 Even if relief of this type is
granted it is incapable of enforcement and cannot give the promisee any
effective protection.
Confusion of the contractual with the testamentary concept is
particularly noticeable in the joint and mutual will cases where it is
often said that either party to the transaction is free to revoke his undertaking at any time prior to the death of the other.27 Of course a will
23. Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 59 N.E.2d 568 (1945); Stewart v.
Shelton, 356 Mo. 258, 201 S.W.2d 395 (1947); Phillip v. Phillip, 96 Misc. Rep. 471,
160 N.Y. Supp. 624 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
24. Mug v. Ostendorf, 49 Ind. App. 71, 96 N.E. 780 (1911); Canada v. Canada,
60 Mass. (6 Cushing) 15 (1850); Smith v. Long, 183 Okla. 441, 83 P.2d 167 (1938);
Moorhead v. Fry, 24 Pa. (12 Harris) 37 (1854).
25. Edwards v. Slate, 184 Mass. 317, 68 N.E. 342 (1903); see Farrington v. Richardson, 153 Fla. 907, 16 So.2d 158 (1944) (action brought within the life of the
promisor but the promisor died while the suit was pending).
26. See Stone v. Burgeson, 215 Ala. 23, 109 So. 155 (1926) (denying a petition
for an affirmative injunction to compel the execution of a will). A New Jersey
court actually granted an injunction against the execution of a will inconsistent with
a contract. Duvale v. Duvale, 54 N.J.Eq. 581, 35 Ati. 750 (1896), modified and affd,
56 N.J.Eq. 375, 39 Ati. 687, 40 Atl. 440 (1898). In Indiana an injunction was granted
against the revocation of a will which had been executed in pursuance of a contract.
Lovett v. Lovett, 87 Ind. App. 42, 155 N.E. 528, rehearing denied, 87 Ind. App. 42,
157 N.E. 104 (1927), noted, 3 IND. L. J. 242 (1927); 26 Mhcn. L. REv. 464 (1928); 7
TENx. L. REV. 66 (1928); 1 U. oF CiN. L. REv. 498 (1928); 76 U. or PA. L. REv. 110
(1927). Apparently no one has suggested any means of enforcing injunctive relief
of the kind here described. If it could be enforced it would conflict with the basic
concept of the meaning of a will.
27. Although statements to this effect are quite common they are almost invariably dicta and appear in cases where no decision on the point was called for.
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can always be revoked so long as the testator is alive and sui juris, and
if the will is the only element involved that is the end of the matter
whether it be a joint or mutual will or any other type of will. If a
contract has been entered into both parties are bound from the moment
the bargain is made and neither is privileged to rescind without the
concurrence of the other.28 The only proper meaning that can be given
to the frequent statement that the parties are free to rescind while both
are still alive but that the survivor is bound after the death of the first
to die is that while both are living a, mutual rescission is possible but
that after one has died there can be no mutual rescission because one
of the parties is no longer capable of giving his assent.
In the event the promisor dies leaving an inconsistent will or leaving
no will at all it cannot be over emphasized that the remedy of the
promisee is in contract. The contract cannot be probated as a will nor
can it be used to prevent probate of an inconsistent will. The testator's
last will is entitled to probate regardless of what contractual arrangements he might have had. 29 The remedy of the promisee is through an

action on the contract which may be brought in the same way as any
other contract action where some future date has been set as the time
for performance on one side. The death of the promisor is the event
upon which performance by him is due. The promisee may bring an
action at law against the personal representative for breach of contract.30

See Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 84-85, 90 N.E. 216, 218 (1909); Luthy v. Seaburn,
242 Iowa 184, 190-191, 46 N.W.2d 44, 48 (1951); Wright v. Wright, 215 Ky. 394, 400,
285 S.W. 188. 190 (1926); Edson v. Parsons, 155 N.Y. 555, 566, 50 N.E. 265, 268 (1898).
28. Trindle v. Zimmerman, 115 Colo. 323, 172 P.2d 676 (1946); Curry v. Cotton,
356 IlM. 538, 191 N.E. 307 (1934); Stewart v. Todd, 190 Iowa 283, 173 N.W. 619 (1919),
modified, 190 Iowa 296, 180 N.W. 146 (1920); Brown v. Webster, 90 Neb. 591, 134
N.W. 185 (1912). Contra: Stone v. Hoskins [1905] L.R., P.D. 194.
29. In re Rolls' Estate, 193 Calif. 594, 226 Pac. 608 (1924); Manrow v. Deveney,
109 Ind. App. 264, 33 N.E.2d 371 (1941); Matter of the Estate of Adkins, 161 Kan.
239, 167 P.2d 618 (1946); Sumner v. Crane, 155 Mass. 483, 29 N.E. 1151 (1892); Morgan
v. Sanborn, 225 N.Y. 454, 122 N.E. 696 (1919); Van Vlack v. Van Vlack, 181 Ore. 646,
182 P.2d 969, rehearing denied, 185 P.2d 575 (1947); Hobson v. Blackburn, 1 Add.
274, 162 Eng. Rep. 96 (1822); Pohlman v. Untzellman, 2 Lee 319, 161 Eng. Rep. 355
(1756). Contra: Walker v. Yarbrough, 200 Ala. 458, 76 So. 390 (1917); Frazier v.
Patterson, 243 IM. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909); Hatcher v. Sawyer, 243 Iowa 858, 52 N.W.2d
490 (1952).

30. Ex parte Simons, 247 U.S. 231 (1918); Roy v. Pos, 183 Calif. 359, 191 Pac.
542 (1920); Strakosch v. Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 96 Conn. 471, 114 Atl.
660 (1921); Farrington v. Richardson, 153 Fla. 907, 16 So.2d 158 (1944); Gordon v.
Spellman, 145 Ga. 682, 89 S.E. 749 (1916); Thompson v. Romack, 174 Iowa 155, 156
N.W. 310 (1916); Smal's Adm'r v. Peters, 233 Ky. 576, 26 S.W.2d 491 (1930); Jenkins
v. Stetson, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 128 (1864); Cullen v. Woolverton, 65 N.J.L. 279,
47 Atl. 626 (1900).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol20/iss1/6
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The judgment recovered occupies an equal status with other bona fide
debts against the estate and must be satisfied before there is anything
available for distributees or legatees. 31 If the property promised consists

of specific real estate or unique chattels an action in the nature of specific
performance may be maintained to recover the specific property in the
same manner as if it had been a contract to sell which had not been fully
executed. 32 An action in the nature of specific performance will also
lie in case of a contract to devise or bequeath all or a specified fractional
part of the estate. In such an action the promisee is entitled to all or a
fractional part of such property as remains after all outstanding bona
fide obligations have been paid but before anything is given to distributees or legatees.33 The action is in equity since the amount of the
recovery depends upon the net value of the estate and the law court
34
has no suitable machinery for the supervision of an estate accounting.
Here again it should be noted that the relief available depends upon
the usual principles of contract law and the fact that the thing bargained for is the making of a will does not within itself give any special
significance to the transaction. The substance of the thing agreed upon
is the transfer of property to the promisee at the death of the promisor.
The remedy granted by the courts seeks either to accomplish that result
or to award damages for its failure. The fact that a will was the vehicle
through which it was contemplated that the desired result would be
achieved is merely incidental.
Since no performance by the promisor is due until the date of his
death the period of the statute of limitations will not begin to run

31. Questions of priority have not often been before the courts and clear author-

ity on this point is lacking. What is said here would seem to be the inevitable result

from remedy granted in the cases cited in note 29 supra. See also Searcy v. Clark,
190 Ark. 1069, 82 S.W.2d 839 (1935) (involving a promissory note payable at death).
32. Fred v. Asbury, 105 Ark. 494, 152 S.W. 155 (1912); Anson v. Haywood,
397 IM. 370, 74 N.E.2d 489 (1947); Krcmar v. Krcmar, 202 Iowa 1166, 211 N.W. 699
(1927); Legro v. Kelley, 311 Mass. 674, 42 N.E.2d 836 (1942); McDonald v. Scheifler,
323 Mich. 117, 34 N.W.2d 573 (1948); Anding v. Davis, 38 Miss. 574 (1860); Adams
v. Moberg, 356 Mo. 1175, 205 S.W.2d 553 (1947); Teske v. Dittberner, 70 Neb. 544, 98
N.W. 57 (1903); Loffus v. Maw, 3 Giff. 592, 66 Eng. Rep. 544 (1862).
33. Lang v. Chase, 130 Me. 267, 155 AtI. 273 (1931); In re Peterson, 76 Neb.
652, 107 N.W. 993 (1906); affd and explained on rehearing, 76 Neb. 661, 111 N.W.
361 (1907); Day v. Washburn, 76 N.H. 203, 81 Atl. 474 (1911); O'Connor v. Immele,
77 N.D. 346, 43 N.W.2d 649 (1950); Estate of Soles, 215 Wis. 129, 253 N.W. 801 (1934).
34. In re Peterson, 76 Neb. 652, 107 N.W. 993 (1906), affd and explained on
rehearing, 76 Neb. 661, 111 N.W. 361 (1907).
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against the promisee's cause of action until that date.3 5 This is true even
though action on the contract is barred by the Statute of Frauds and
the proinisee is limited to an action in quantum meruit for the value of
the services rendered under the contract and the services were actually
completed several years before the promisor died.30 The promisee will
not be compelled to bring his action until a performance is actually due.
If the action is at law for damages the claim should be filed against the
estate within the period set by the usual non-claim statutes.3 7 If the
action is in equity where the claim is not against the estate, but rather
a claim to title to property, there appears no reason why the action
could not be brought against the heirs or devisees after the expiration
of the period for filing claims against the estate.38 Of course it must
be assumed that the equitable doctrine of laches would apply here as well
as elsewhere.3 9
If the promisor marries after entering into a contract to devise or
bequeath and his spouse survives him and claims dower or a statutory
distributive share in his estate an element of uncertainty is introduced.
Since an obligation was assumed by the promisor and rights acquired
by the promisee prior to the marriage the normal result to expect would
be that the right of the subsequent spouse to either dower or distributive
share would be subject to the rights of the promisee under the contract.40 Application of this reasoning to a contract to dispose of an entire

35. Troxel v. Childers, 299 Ky. 719, 187 S.W.2d 264 (1945); Succession of Oliver,
184 La. 26, 165 So. 318 (1936); Ellis v. Berry, 145 Miss. 652, 110 So. 211 (1926); Roth
v. Roth, 340 Mo. 1043, 104 S.W.2d 314 (1937); Poole v. Janovy, 131 Okla. 219, 268 Pac.
291 (1928); In re Schoenbachler's Estate, 310 Pa. 396, 165 AtI. 505 (1933); Green v.
Orgain, 46 S.W. 477 (Tenn. 1898).
36. Quirk v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 244 Fed. 682 (6th Cir. 1917);
Costello v. Costello, 134 Conn. 536, 59 A.2d 520 (1948); Schempp v. Beardsley, 83
Conn. 34, 75 Atl. 141 (1910); Poole v. Janovy, 131 Okla. 219, 268 Pac. 291 (1928);
In re Schoenbachler's Estate, 310 Pa. 396, 165 Atl. 505 (1933); Goodloe v. Goodloe,
116 Tenn. 252, 92 S.W. 767 (1905). Contra: Long v. Rumsey, 12 Calif. 2d 334, 84 P.2d
146 (1938), noted, 27 CALiF. L. REv. 473 (1939); Estate of Leu, 172 Wis. 530, 179
N.W. 796 (1920).
37. Morrison v. Land, 169 Calif. 580, 147 Pac. 259 (1915); Grant v. Grant, 63 Conn.
530, 29 Al. 15 (1893); Estate of Leu, 172 Wis. 530, 179 N.W. 796 (1920).
38. Fred v. Asbury, 105 Ark. 494, 152 S.W. 155 (1912); Furman v. Craine, 18
Calif. App. 41, 121 Pac. 1007 (1912); Oles v. Wilson, 57 Colo. 246, 141 Pac. 489 (1914);
Brickley v. Leonard, 129 Me. 94, 149 Atl. 833 (1930); Svanburg v. Fosseen, 75 Minn.
350, 78 N.W. 4 (1899); O'Connor v. Immele, 77 N.D. 346, 43 N.W.2d 649 (1950);
McCullough v. McCullough, 153 Wash. 625, 280 Pac. 70 (1929).
39. Young v. Young, 45 N.J.Eq. 27, 16 Atl. 921 (1889).
40. Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N.W. 998 (1910); In re Davis' Estate, 171
Kan. 605, 237 P.2d 396 (1951); Price v. Craig, 164 Miss. 42, 143 So. 694 (1932); Ralyea
v. Venners, 155 Misc. Rep. 539, 280 N.Y. Supp. 8 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Burdine v. Burdine's
Ex'r, 98 Va. 515, 36 S.E. 992 (1900).
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estate would have the effect of disabling a promisor from ever conferring
any dower or inheritance rights upon a future spouse. Equity has sometimes denied enforcement of such contracts under these circumstances
on the ground that enforcement would be unjust or inequitable to a
surviving spouse who was unaware of the contract at the time of the
marriage. 41 The same protection has occasionally been extended to the
surviving spouse in cases involving specific property 42 or a legacy of a
certain amount. 43 It is doubtful if this result is proper or desirable. If
it were a contract to convey certain property or to pay a specific sum
of money at a stated future date it is clear that no claim of dower or
statutory share by a spouse who became such after the formation of
the contract could interfere with the promisee's rights. It should be
equally clear that a contract to devise or bequeath is likewise a contract
for a future transfer which should not be hindered by the claims of
an intervening spouse. If the contract is for an entire estate the protection given the subsequent spouse might be justified by the public policy
against permanently disabling oneself from conferring a marital property
right upon a future wife or husband. The burden of uncertainty thus cast
upon the promisee is not an unreasonable one since he contracted for an
indefinite quantity which might possibly be reduced to zero before the
date of performance in any case, and even if a subsequent spouse does
intervene he may still enforce the contract as to all property other than
the spouse's share 44 or he may recover in quantum meruit for the value
of the consideration rendered. 45
A contract to make a will is a contract and the interests created by
it must be analyzed according to contract principles. It is a device born
out of a social need for which there appears no other satisfactory answer
and its skillful use is a responsibility of the legal profession. It is an
arrangement for devolution of property but it is materially different
from a will in that it is not ambulatory. While a will has no effect until
death of the testator and is freely revocable until that time a contract
has immediate effect and cannot be rescinded unilaterally without in-

41. Owens v. McNally, 113 Calif. 444, 45 Pac. 710 (1896); Wides v. Wides' Ex'r,
299 Ky. 103, 184 S.W.2d 579 (1944); Van Duyne v. Vreeland, 12 N.J.Eq. (1 Beasley)
142 (1858).
42. Ver Standig v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 344 Mo. 880, 129 S.W.2d 905 (1939).
43. In re Hoyt's Estate, 174 Misc. Rep. 512, 21 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
44. Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 299 Ky. 103, 184 S.W.2d 579 (1944); Ver Standig v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 344 Mo. 880, 129 S.W.2d 905 (1939).
45. See Owens v. McNally, 113 Calif. 444, 454, 45 Pac. 710, 713 (1896).
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curring a liability for breach of contract. A contract to make a will is
not a proper instrument to use unless the promisor is ready to make a
final and irrevocable commitment for the disposition of his property,
but if it is always understood as an arrangement of this type it can be
a useful tool in every estate planner's kit. There are many circumstances under which it is the only suitable means of providing for care
of the aged or of infants, making family settlements, arranging for property dispositions upon divorce or separation, providing for certain
types of business planning, and meeting many other everyday needs.
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